**COT3100H / Spring 2006 / Addendum to Lecture Notes #2** 

### Introduction to Cryptography

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- 1. Introduction to cryptography
- 2. Cryptosystem and cryptanalysis
- 3. The RSA cryptosystem
- 4. Digital signatures
- 5. Secret sharing schemes



- Cryptography is the field concerned with techniques for securing information, particularly in communications;
- Cryptography focuses on the following paradigms:
  - Authentication the process of proving one's identity (the primary forms of host-to-host authentication on the Internet today are name-based or address-based, both of which are notoriously weak);
  - Privacy/confidentiality ensuring that no one can read the message except the intended receiver;
  - Integrity assuring the receiver that the received message has not been altered in any way from the original;
  - Non-repudiation a mechanism to prove that the sender really sent this message.

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Applications of cryptography:

- computer and information security: cryptography is necessary when communicating over any untrusted medium, which includes just about any network, particularly the Internet;
- e-commerce, e-payment, e-voting, e-auction, e-lottery, and e-gambling schemes, are all based on cryptographic (security) protocols.

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A few examples of concrete applications are in order:

- IPsec = IP Security Protocol
  - Standard for cryptographically-based authentication, integrity, and confidentiality services at the IP datagram layer
  - Uses RSA, DH, MD5, DES, 3DES, and SHA1
- SSL & TLS
  - SSL = Secure Sockets Layer
  - Allows a "secure pipe" between any two applications for secure transfer of data and mutual authentication
  - TLS = Transport Layer Security
  - TLS is the latest enhancement of SSL
  - Uses RSA, DH, RC4, MD5, DES, 3DES, and SHA1

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- DNSSEC
  - DNSSEC = Domain Name System Security Extensions
  - Protocol for secure distributed name services such as hostname and IP address lookup
  - Uses RSA, MD5, and DSA
- IEEE 802.11
  - Protocol standard for secure wireless Local Area Network products
  - Uses RC4 and MD5

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- DOCSIS,
  - DOCSIS = Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification
  - Cable modem standard for secure transmission of data with protection from theft-of-service and denial-of-service attacks and for protecting the privacy of cable customers
  - Uses RSA, DES, HMAC, and SHA1
- CDPD
  - CDPD = Cellular Digital Packet Data
  - It is a standard designed to enable customers to send computer data over existing cellular networks
  - Uses DH and RC4
- PPTP, SET, S/MIME etc.

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A brief history of cryptography:

- The oldest forms of cryptography date back to at least Ancient Egypt, when derivations of the standard hieroglyphs of the day were used to communicate;
- Julius Caesar (100-44 BC) used a simple substitution cipher with the normal alphabet (just shifting the letters a fixed amount) in government communications (Caesar cipher);
- Thomas Jefferson, the father of American cryptography, invented a wheel cipher in the 1790's, which would be redeveloped as the Strip Cipher, M-138-A, used by the US Navy during World War II;

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- During World War II, two notable machines were employed: the German's Enigma machine, developed by Arthur Scherbius, and the Japanese Purple Machine, developed using techniques first discovered by Herbert O. Yardley;
- William Frederick Friedman, the father of American cryptanalysis, led a team which broke in 1940 the Japanese Purple Code;
- In the 1970s, Horst Feistel developed a "family" of ciphers, the Feistel ciphers, while working at IBM's Watson Research Laboratory. In 1976, The National Security Agency (NSA) worked with the Feistel ciphers to establish FIPS PUB-46, known today as DES;

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- In 1976, Martin Hellman, Whitfield Diffie, and Ralph Merkle, have introduced the concept of public-key cryptography;
- In 1977, Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard M. Adleman proposed the first public-key cipher which is still secure and used (it is known as RSA);
- The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) built the first unclassified hardware for cracking messages encoded with DES. On July 17, 1998, the EFF DES Cracker was used to recover a DES key in 22 hours. The consensus of the cryptographic community was that DES was not secure;
- In October 2001, after a long searching process, NIST selected the Rijndael cipher, invented by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, as the Advanced Encryption Standard. The standard was published in November 2002.

# **Solution** Cryptosystem and cryptanalysis

**Definition 1** A cryptosystem or cipher is a 5-tuple  $\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ , where:

- (1)  $\mathcal{P}$  is a non-empty finite set of plaintext symbols;
- (2) C is a non-empty finite set of cryptotext symbols;
- (3)  $\mathcal{K}$  is a non-empty finite set of keys;
- (4)  $\mathcal{E}$  and  $\mathcal{D}$  are two sets of functions (algorithms)

 $\mathcal{E} = \{e_K : \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{C} | K \in \mathcal{K}\} \text{ and } \mathcal{D} = \{d_K : \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{P} | K \in \mathcal{K}\},\$ 

such that  $d_K(e_K(x)) = x$ , for any  $K \in \mathcal{K}$  and  $x \in \mathcal{P}$ .

 $e_K$  is the encryption rule (algorithm), and  $d_K$  is the decryption rule (algorithm), induced by K.

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# **Solution** Cryptosystem and cryptanalysis

Let S = (P, C, K, E, D) be a cipher. A plaintext (cryptotext) is a finite sequence of plaintext (cryptotext) symbols. If  $x = x_1 \cdots x_n$  is a plaintext, then it can be encrypted by S in one of the following two ways:

• (Fixed-key encryption). Generate a key K and encrypt each plaintext symbol by  $e_K$ :

$$y = e_K(x_1) \cdots e_K(x_n);$$

• (Variable-key encryption). Generate a sequence of keys  $K_1, \ldots, K_n$  and encrypt each plaintext symbol  $x_i$  by  $e_{K_1}$ :

$$y = e_{K_1}(x_1) \cdots e_{K_n}(x_n).$$

**Remark 1** We will mainly use the fixed-key encryption mode.

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



Figure 1: Communication between two entities A and B via a cryptosystem

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## **G** Cryptosystem and cryptanalysis

Cryptosystems can be classified into:


Symmetric (private-key, single-key) cryptosystems – characterized by the fact that it is easy to compute the decryption rule  $d_K$  from  $e_K$ , and vice-versa



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# **Cryptosystem and cryptanalysis**

**asymmetric (public-key) cryptosystems** – characterized by the fact that it is hard to compute  $d_K$  from  $e_K$ . With such cryptosystems, the key K is split into two subkeys,  $K_e$ , for encryption, and  $K_d$ , for decryption. Moreover,  $K_e$  can be made public without endangering security



# **Cryptosystem and cryptanalysis**

Most cryptosystems are based on number theory and, therefore, it is customary to view each plaintext symbol as an integer, for instance, based on a one-to-one correspondence like the one below:

		а	b	С	d	е	f	g	h	i	j	k	I	m	
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
	n	0	р	(	q	r	S	t		u	V	W	X	У	Z
-	13	14	15	1	6	17	18	1	9	20	21	22	23	24	25

For instance, the plaintext "home" becomes the sequence of integers "7,14,12,4".

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#### Example 1 (Affine Cryptosystems)

- $\mathcal{K} = \{ (a, b) \in \mathbf{Z}_{26} \times \mathbf{Z}_{26} | gcd(a, 26) = 1 \};$
- If or any key K = (a, b) and  $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_{26}$ ,

 $e_K(x) = (ax + b) \mod 26$  and  $d_k(y) = (a^{-1}(y - b)) \mod 26$ .

Let K = (7,3) and the plaintext pt = hot (pt = 7, 14, 19). Then,

$$e_K(pt) = e_K(7), e_K(14), e_K(19) = 0, 23, 6,$$

that is, the cryptotext is ct = axg.

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Affine cryptosystems can be easily broken by exhaustive key search (EKS), also known as brute-force search, which consists of trying every possible key until you find the right one.

Question: If you have a chunk of cryptotext and decrypt it with one key after the other, how does you know when you found the correct plaintext?

Answer: You know that you have found the plaintext because it looks like plaintext. Plaintext tends to look like plaintext. It's an English-language message, or a data file from a computer application (e.g., programs like Microsoft Word have large known headers), or a database in a reasonable format. When you look at a decrypted file, it looks like something understandable. When you look at a cryptotext file, or a file decrypted with the wrong key, it looks like gibberish.

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## **G** Cryptosystem and cryptanalysis

#### Question: How many keys are?

Answer: If an affine cryptosystem is developed over  $\mathbb{Z}_{26}$ , then there are only  $\phi(26) \times 26 = 12 \times 26 = 312$  possible keys.

As a conclusion, given an affine cryptosystem, it is very easy to enumerate all its keys and break it using a laptop (assuming that you have a chunk of cryptotext).

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In 1977, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, proposed the first public-key cryptosystem which is still secure and used.

#### The RSA cryptosystem

let p and q be two distinct primes, and n = pq;

$$P = C = \mathbf{Z}_n;$$

● for any 
$$K = (n, p, q, e, d) \in \mathcal{K}$$
 and  $x, y \in \mathbf{Z}_n$ ,

 $e_K(x) = x^e \mod n \text{ and } d_K(y) = y^d \mod n;$ 

(n, e) is the public key, and (p, q, d) is the secret key.

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**Example 2** (with artificially small parameters) Let p = 61 and q = 53. Then:

● 
$$n = pq = 3233$$
 and  $\phi(n) = 3120$ ;

- If we chose e = 17, then d can be computed with the extended Euclidean algorithm. We obtain  $d = e^{-1} \mod 3120 = 2753$ ;
- $\square$  n = 3233 and e = 17 are public parameters; p, q, and d secrete;

Let x = 123 be a plaintext. The cryptotext is

 $y = 123^{17} \mod 3233 = 855.$ 

In order to decrypt y we have to compute

 $855^{2753} \mod 3233 = 123.$ 

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Security issues:

- if p or q is recovered (e.g., by factoring n in reasonable time), then the system is completely broken;
- If  $\phi(n)$  can be computed in reasonable time, then the system is completely broken;
- If d can be easily computed from n and e, then the system is completely broken.

In practice:

- $\checkmark$  p and q are 512-bit primes (or even larger);
- *e* is small (fast encryption) but chosen such that  $d > \sqrt[4]{n}$  (otherwise, an efficient attack can be mounted).

For more details: http://www.rsasecurity.com/.

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Public key cryptography solves another problem crucial to e-commerce and Internet cyber relationship: it lets you emulate written signatures. This use of public key technology is called a **digital signature**.


#### A digital signature must provide:

- authenticity and integrity. That is, it must be "impossible" for anyone who does not have access to the secret key to forge  $(x, \sigma)$  $(x \text{ is the original data and } \sigma \text{ is its associated signature});$
- non-repudiation. That is, it must be impossible for the legitimate signer to repudiate his own signature.

Signing (encrypting with a private key) is extremely slow, so you usually add a time-saving (and space-saving) step before you encrypt messages. It is called message digesting or hashing.

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A hash algorithm (function) is an algorithm (function) which, applied to an arbitrary-length input data, produces a fixed-length output data (called a hash value or message digest or fingerprint). A hash algorithm should be resistant to collisions.

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Any public key cipher can be used to produce digital signatures:

If  $K = (K_e, K_d)$  is A's key, then the encryption of a message x by  $K_d$  (which is A's private key) is the digital signature associated to x. It can be verified by the public key  $K_e$ :

$$x \stackrel{?}{=} d_{K_e}(e_{K_e}(x)).$$

The RSA signature is obtained from the RSA public key cipher.

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An important application of the Chinese remainder theorem concerns the construction of (k, n)-threshold sharing schemes.

A (k, n)-threshold sharing scheme consists of n people  $P_1, \ldots, P_n$  sharing a secret S in such a way that the following properties hold:


- $\ \, \bullet \ \, k \leq n;$
- leach  $P_i$  has an information  $I_i$ ;
- If knowledge of any k of  $I_1, \ldots, I_k$  enables one to find S easily;
- In the second secon

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We will show how a (k, n)-threshold sharing scheme can be constructed:

🥒 let



be a sequence of pairwise co-prime numbers such that

$$\alpha = m_1 \cdots m_k > m_{n-k+2} \cdots m_n = \beta;$$

- It is be a secret,  $\beta < S < \alpha$ ;
- each  $P_i$  gets the information  $I_i = S \mod m_i$ .

This is called Mignotte's secret sharing scheme.

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Any group of k people,  $P_{i_1}, \ldots, P_{i_k}$ , can recover uniquely the secret S by solving the system:

$$(*) \begin{cases} x \equiv I_{i_1} \mod m_{i_1} \\ \cdots \\ x \equiv I_{i_k} \mod m_{i_k} \end{cases}$$

According to the Chinese remainder theorem, this system has a unique solution modulo  $m_{i_1} \cdots m_{i_k}$ , and this solution is *S* because

$$S < \alpha < m_{i_1} \cdots m_{i_k}.$$

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No group of k - 1 people,  $P_{j_1}, \ldots, P_{j_k}$ , can recover uniquely the secret *S* by solving the system:

$$(**) \begin{cases} x \equiv I_{j_1} \mod m_{j_1} \\ \cdots \\ x \equiv I_{j_{k-1}} \mod m_{j_{k-1}} \end{cases}$$

According to the Chinese remainder theorem, this system has a unique solution modulo  $m_{j_1} \cdots m_{j_{k-1}}$ , and this solution, denoted  $x_0$ , satisfies

$$x_0 < m_{j_1} \cdots m_{j_{k-1}} \le \beta.$$

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